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Yanis (Varoufakis), the Minotaur, 
 and the Field of Eurocracy 
Didier Georgakakis & Frédéric Lebaron ∗ 
Abstract: »Yanis (Varoufakis), der Minotaurus und das Feld der Eurokratie«. This 
paper aims to show the binding force within the social field of Eurocracy and, 
more specifically, the subfield of the European economic governance, through 
the singular case of Yanis Varoufakis's experience as Greek minister of finance. 
Why is it that, while many elements might have suggested that Varoufakis was 
not lacking resources, his passage from economics into politics ended up in a 
fairly brutal shock and a mutual exclusion so extremely invested in on the sym-
bolic level? The paper’s hypothesis is that a substantial part of the strategies of 
the epistemic agent Varoufakis – an experienced economist as well as new ruler 
and new politician in the EU game – were completely out of tune with the 
structure of the field. To show this, the paper deliberately breaks with the caus-
al analysis of the bargain inside the Eurogroup to build on the use of two mul-
tiple correspondence analyses (MCA). The first describes a view of (and from) 
the silent fraction of the field, composed of insiders in the European admin-
istrations. The second reconstructs Varoufakis's own relational position and vi-
sion of the game from the book he wrote on his experience. Thanks to these 
two approaches, we combine a descriptive-institutional and a narrative-
individual construction of the same social space to explore its deep structure 
and effects in an innovative way. 
Keywords: European Union, political economy, eurocracy, field theory, multiple 
correspondence analysis, financial crisis, European Central Bank, European 
Commission, Greece. 
1.   Introduction 
This article begins with three short metaphorical questions freely inspired by 
Yanis Varoufakis’s book The Global Minotaur (2011). Was Varoufakis likely 
to become a new Theseus? Would he not have confused Ariane with her 
grandmother, Europe? And has he finally lost himself in a labyrinth other than 
the one of global economic power? These questions ultimately raise the issue 
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of the structure of the field of European economic governance and how it af-
fects both the outputs and the margins of manoeuvre of its main players. 
The field of concrete social agents competing to define economic policies 
seems to us largely underestimated in the available theories. While the idea that 
purely economic conditions can be considered separately from political and 
institutional factors has long been overturned, there is still a longstanding de-
bate about the nature and possible characterization of the space of power in 
which economic public policies are driven. This is particularly true in the case 
of European policies. Indeed, many authors on this subject seem to reproduce 
the dichotomy, highly institutionalized in the field of European studies, oppos-
ing so-called ‘intergovernmental’ theories and other more ‘neo-functionalist’ 
theories. The reductive nature of this dichotomy, which is often close to sinking 
into old-institutionalism rather than renewing neo-institutionalism, has been 
widely debated, as has recently its scholastic origin (Rosamond 2016). However, 
it has come back forcefully and in a partially renewed form in the debate on 
Euro and debt policies at the height of the crisis of the 2010s. Aimed against a 
now new intergovernmentalism (Puetter 2011) that quite rightly points to the 
increasing weight of the negotiations between Member States’ representatives in 
light of the crisis situation, other studies quasi-symmetrically show the power 
gained by the European Commission as a neutral place for managing the Mem-
ber States’ budgets (Bauer and Becker 2014).  
Without denying the contribution of these studies, it seems to us that an 
analysis more directly inspired by field theory would make it possible to pre-
sent a more realistic picture of how things are going. To summarize some of its 
principles, field theory establishes a continuum between actors who are organi-
zationally or politically separated and shows that their cleavages can be struc-
tured by variables other than purely institutional ones (socialization in the field, 
politics, economics, social dimensions of the positions of power, etc.), especial-
ly by the unequal distribution of power assets within the field. It does not limit 
the circle of relevant actors to collective actors, such as organizations or the 
actors who populate them, but builds a wider circle of actors (representatives of 
other institutions, other economic and political powers) whose importance has 
been shown by many authors in the case of global finances (Matthijs and Blyth 
2018; Ban and Patenaude, forthcoming; Ban, Seabrook and Freitas 2016). Final-
ly, it invites us to take into account the relationships that this transversal field 
maintains with others, each socially structured according to similar principles. 
Neither decisionist in the sense that it would establish the primacy of political 
power nor determinist in the sense that the field would be frozen within its 
socio-institutional structure, field theory aims, here as elsewhere, to build the 
space of relations between individual and collective actors in its dual dimen-
sion as an acting structure as well as a place of structured agency. 
From this perspective, the present paper aims to show the binding force the 
field of Eurocracy (Georgakakis and Rowell 2013) and, more specifically here, 
HSR 43 (2018) 3  │  218 
that of the subfield of European economic governance, through the singular 
case of Varoufakis’s ultimately rather brief encounter with this field. Va-
roufakis, an academic economist who spent a large part of his career at the 
international level and particularly in the United States, entered the most politi-
cal part of the field when he was appointed Minister of Finance in Alexis 
Tsipras’s administration. The latter came to power in Greece in January 2015 
with an agenda aimed at breaking radically with austerity policies stemming 
from the implementation of the European aid program supported by the ‘troika’ 
since 2010. Varoufakis thus illustrates the figure of academic economists em-
bracing political trajectories, which we find very frequently in the world of 
central bankers (Lebaron and Dogan 2016). He became a member of the Eu-
rogroup and was directly involved in permanent negotiations between the 
Greek government and the ‘troika.’ In July 2015, however, he left the Tsipras 
administration due to disagreements with the Prime Minister’s position on 
creditors. Since then, he has regularly taken a stand on national and European 
political and economic issues and has founded a pan-European movement 
(DIEM25), now from both the intellectual and political outer limits of this field. 
Brief, and extremely well-documented both in the press and in his book, the 
timeline of Varoufakis’s encounter with the heart of the field of European 
economic governance reveals an inseparably cultural and political shock that is 
particularly conducive to analysis. Our research question can therefore be 
phrased in the form of the following puzzle: While many elements might have 
suggested that Varoufakis was not lacking resources, what is it that made his 
passage from economics to politics end in a fairly brutal shock and mutual 
exclusion that was so extremely invested in on the symbolic level? As much as 
external causes, this question invites us to also inquire as to what played out in 
the encounter between this singular social agent and this field and what condi-
tions influenced his strategies and their effects. Everything that happened 
points to the interpretation (and the fact that most of the narratives presented 
the episode in the form of an exceptional encounter does not deny it) that a 
substantial part of the properties and strategies of the epistemic agent Va-
roufakis – an economist, new ruler, and new politician in the EU game – were 
completely out of tune with the structure of the field.  
To demonstrate this, the paper combines various types of investigation, both 
qualitative and quantitative. Its main angle is to break with the analysis of the 
bargains taking place within the Eurogroup by conducting and comparing two 
multiple correspondence analyses (MCA) in order to obtain different views of 
the field: one describing the field’s European administrative and insiders’ core, 
and another centred around Varoufakis, based on all the actors with whom he 
interacted during his period in office as described in his book Adults In The 
Room: My Battle with Europe’s Deep Establishment (Varoufakis 2017). 
Thanks to these two approaches, we combine a descriptive-institutional and 
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narrative-individual construction of the same social space in order to explore its 
deep structure and effects in an innovative way. 
The article proceeds in three stages. Based on a brief theoretical discussion 
of and an exploratory inquiry into the European institutions’ fraction of the 
field, the first part reveals the importance and some structural characteristics of 
the field of European economic governance as a subfield of the more general 
field of Eurocracy. The second part continues with an analysis of the trajectory 
of Varoufakis and more generally of his world, as reconstructed from the testi-
mony he gives in his book. The third part draws the inquiry to a close by knit-
ting together the threads of what Varoufakis’s experience of encountering this 
very specific field context tells us specifically about the labyrinth of European 
economic governance. 
2. The Field of European Economic Policies as a Subfield 
of Eurocracy 
Analyses of EU politics and policies now based on field theory have multiplied 
(for instance, Bigo 2011; Kauppi 2005, 2010; Favell and Guiraudon 2009; 
Schmidt-Wellenburg 2017). Their main contributions and their transatlantic 
differences (Georgakakis and Vauchez 2015; Kluttz and Fligstein 2017) are not 
summarized here. Instead, we would like to underline the relative singularity of 
the ‘field of Eurocracy’ theory, which seems to us to be one of the keys to the 
analysis of European economic governance, its main structures and, finally, the 
conditions of its own inertia: in short, to show the potential gain of an analysis 
of the social and political field of European economic governance understood 
as a subfield of the field of Eurocracy.  
2.1  The Field and Subfields of Eurocracy 
One of the decisive points in conceptualizing the field of Eurocracy is to define 
European integration as the formation of a transnational ‘bureaucratic field’ 
rather than political integration. The gradual monopolization of the manage-
ment of European affairs by a field of competition between individual and 
collective actors has been achieved in a form that ultimately escapes the rules 
and strategies of the political field based on political representation, as well as 
of a field of European power understood as the meeting place between the 
dominants of the different fields of power. Understood as such, the field of 
Eurocracy is more like a social field of delegation, a relay field so to speak, 
where the inputs coming from different fields of power (global, local, political, 
economic, social, etc.) are translated and operationalized into common policies. 
In this definition, political authorities are part of the field, but they do not nec-
essarily occupy the decisive position, either because they act only occasionally 
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as heads of state and government or ministers, or because they are confined to a 
position that is otherwise marginal, or at least not decisive in terms of the main 
impulses, like most members of the European Parliament, who are largely 
marginalized in managing the economic crisis. 
This distinction between the formal appearance of politics and a reality 
which is, at least in ordinary times, more a matter of collective bureaucratic 
agency is not unique to the European Union. Nevertheless, it displays all the 
features of one in a context of indirect diplomatic democracy whose social and 
political structure is largely segmented and weakly embodied and coordinated, 
with the exception of the so-called European elections. This does not exclude 
variations. Undeniably, in the context defined as a crisis context, there is a 
temporary premium on the most political agents, but these conjunctions are in 
fact quite extraordinary, as shown by the sudden rise in dramatic narration or 
the use of symbolic group reinsurance technologies (through family photos, 
demonstrative hugs by heads of state or others). Outside the short duration of the 
summits, the first to be strung up are the agents who, on behalf of the Member 
States and the European institutions, prepare, frame the cognitive agenda, im-
plement, routinize, and ultimately ensure its capacity to withstand crises. 
This general observation implies that the structures of the field create an op-
position not only between the dominant agents and those who are less dominant 
(incumbent or outsiders, as Fligstein and McAdam 2012 would say), but also 
between the agents according to their type of assets or capital. Depending on 
the arena involved, three dividing lines appear to be structuring the field. The 
first is the opposition between permanent actors in the field, whose authority 
rests on the intimate knowledge of the machine, its practices, and its actors, and 
intermittent actors, whose intervention can occur with more political authority 
a priori because they are better embedded in society, but are also in relative 
ignorance of the machine or coalitions that they will have to build with or 
against the most permanent agents. The second division is between social 
agents opposed to strong legal-political capital and others more directly linked 
to the economy (in its public or private fraction). Thirdly, especially when we 
go into the details of organizations, there is an opposition between diplomatic-
political (or horizontal) skills (with cross-sector experiences) and other more 
technical and sectoral abilities (Georgakakis and de Lassalle 2007). As a meet-
ing place where the definition of legitimate properties is played out in order to 
speak and, above all, to act on behalf of Europe, the field in this general form is 
nevertheless a theoretical representation aimed at modelling the infinite scope 
of the micro-negotiation arenas and the decisions that constitute it. In the same 
vein, its impact on public policy can be seen as related to the local logic of the 
subfields in which problems and, above all, political remedies are constructed 
at the European level. 
The field of European economic governance is one of these subfields. Like 
other subfields, it combines local singularity (such as the strong inscription of 
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European central bankers within a space of economists dominated by the United 
States; Lebaron 2013; Fourcade 2009) with a reproduction of tensions that are 
common in the field of Eurocracy. While the crisis could have been defined as a 
moment of great instability (characterized by the regular waltz of the chiefs of 
government and their economic ministers, except in Germany), this field is 
conversely characterized by a deep social stability, with the exception of some 
changes studied below. This latter characterization (our hypothesis) has contrib-
uted both to maintaining the general legal interpretation of the Euro area 
framework (Lebaron 2006) and the paradigm of austerity (Georgakakis and 
Lebaron, forthcoming), as well as to defining the margins of play in which the 
adjustments that characterized the period (quantitative easing, Junker plan, etc.) 
were negotiated. 
2.2  Mapping the Field of European Economic Governance 
In order to refine the analysis and compare two states in terms of the field, the 
most ‘European and permanent’ fraction of this field of economic governance 
was studied on an exploratory basis from biographical sources coming from 
Eurosource (published by Dods and Trombinoscope), which can be seen as an 
indicator that it belongs to this part of the field. The study mapped out the 
positions and of all the directors of the General Secretariat of the Council, the 
‘economic’ Directorates-General of the Commission (Ecfin, competition, 
budget, taxation, trade, internal market, industry and enterprise, Eurostat) and 
the European Central Bank. The selection considered here is the result of a 
compromise between theoretical considerations aimed at mapping the social 
power structure and practical possibilities. We have therefore deliberately left 
out the strictly national actors (executive heads, finance ministers) and non-
European actors (International Monetary Fund), even if they are obviously part 
of this field (Puetter 2011), in particular the directors of the treasury, who also 
enjoy a certain degree of permanence (Georgakakis and Lebaron 2015). It is 
not said here that all actors are necessarily decision-makers, but they do draw 
on a structure in which most of the actors are linked or embedded.  
The results that we briefly summarize here (see also Appendix 1 and, for a 
more thorough discussion of the same dataset, Georgakakis and Lebaron, forth-
coming; Lebaron 2016) provide empirical evidence of the characteristics of 
individual actors, without losing sight of the fact that their authority is directly 
linked to their positional characteristics (presidency of the Executive Board, 
presidency of the Commission, etc.) and to the institutions for which they are 
the spokespersons and ‘pilots.’ Such an analysis aids an interpretation of the 
power relations as they are established on a daily basis (and not only in the 
most official fora) within the field, between individual actors, institutions, 
countries, etc. 
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Prosopographical survey of actors in the restricted field of European economic 
governance 
The analysed database counts n=311 individuals. 
The structure of this space was analysed using a specific MCA. 
The following 13 variables were used as active variables in the analysis (the 
number of active categories in brackets): 
1) Socio-demographic properties (2 variables, 5 categories): sex (2), age at 
the time of publication (3: under 45 years / 45-60 years / 60 years and 
over) 
2) Educational trajectory (8 variables, 19 categories): main place of train-
ing (3), level of study (3), Economics (2), Law (2), Management (2), Sci-
ences Po-Adm pub (2), Sciences (2) 
3) Career (4 variables, 9 categories): previous experience in administration 
(2), was a cabinet member (3), sectoral mobility (2), held a horizontal 
position (2) 
 
A comparison of the two dates used, 2001-2002 and 2012-2013, reveals some 
variations on both sides of the “heart of the crisis,” the 2008-2012 period. The 
proportion of European as opposed to national curricula is markedly increas-
ing, confirming a process of Europeanization that has long been emphasized 
(Georgakakis and de Lassalle 2007). This process contributes to the growing 
empowerment of European issues, whose dynamics of austerity policies may in 
some respects appear to be a very particular illustration in the more specific 
case of the Euro area, which tends to become a separate universe, cut off from 
the rest of the global power field, a closed field of struggles between highly 
specialized actors and increasingly esoteric for external actors. The proportion of 
PhD holders is also rising quite sharply, revealing a process of scientifization 
or academization (Marcussen 2009; Mudge and Vauchez 2016, 2018) which 
contributes to bringing the economic and legal stakes of European integration 
closer to those of the academic world. This second movement is taking place 
under the obvious impulse of the central banking universe, which is not only a 
pole, but undoubtedly also a model for integrating policy and scientific expertise, 
firstly in the monetary and financial field, but also in the budgetary and macro-
economic fields. This rapprochement may be a double-edged sword, however, 
since it also potentially contributes to putting more force behind the challenges 
of austerity policies emanating from the academic world, such as the one 
launched after 2010, and especially 2012, by recognized American economists. 
Disciplinary domains remained relatively stable between 2001 and 2012, 
with a slight increase in the humanities and social sciences, a decrease in science 
and an overall stability in the relationship between the economy and the law, 
which is still dominated by the economy. The double disciplinary domination 
that has characterized the construction of Europe since its inception has been 
reinforced by the rise in generic power of the pole of economic governance. 
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Moves to the private-sector also increased quite sharply in the biographies, 
particularly for lawyers, but also for banking and finance. 
Figure 1a: Specific MCA “Subfield of Economic Governance in Eurocracy”  
Plane 1-2, Cloud of Individuals  
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Figure 1b: Specific MCA “Subfield of Economic Governance in Eurocracy”  
Plane 1-2, Active Categories  
 
Axis 1 contrasts on the left (negative values): economy, not law, and national 
administration with the values on the right: commissioner’s office, law, not 
economy, European administration, pluri-sectoral mobility, etc. It defines an 
opposition between assets linked to economic science, with an American com-
ponent, but linked to the national administration, and legal assets, which appear 
to be more specific to the European institutions themselves (‘Brussels’). 
Axis 2, which is primarily determined by career-related issues, contrasts 
(top) the absence of horizontal mobility, cabinet passage, sectoral mobility, 
European administration, and passage through a major American university 
with (bottom) passage through a management firm, horizontal and multisec-
toral mobility, national administration and science as well as political science. 
The multipositional surface (i.e., the power related to occupation of a variety of 
positions in administration, politics, higher education, media, etc.) increases 
when one goes down along the axis of political capital (with the passage 
through a cabinet of political leaders), including the national level (passage 
through the national administration), with the possession of diplomas in politi-
cal science. 
These different dimensions correspond to average oppositions between or-
ganizations, as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Specific MCA “Subfield of Economic Governance in Eurocracy”  
Plane 1-2, Cloud of Individuals and EU-Institutions 
 
2.3  Crisis, the Field, and European Policies 
A structural analysis of the subfield shows three elements. First of all, it is 
worth noting that economists in the most economic fraction of the field are not 
in the position of proclaimed independence by which they are usually de-
scribed, nor are they in the position of pure economists, even if they sometimes 
have more provisions than others. They are part of a field of relations that is 
relatively dominated by political and administrative agents with legal-political 
capital and are more inclined to produce and maintain political compromises 
than scientific statements on economics. From this point of view, it can be 
noted that the President of the ECB himself, Jean-Claude Trichet, occupies a 
position which is quite different from that of a pure economist, but which is 
closely linked to the most political part of the field. There is also a tension 
between those closer to the ECB, more economist, more Americanized, and the 
rest of the field, more legal-political, more European. 
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It is then due to the state of the field and the relative weakness of the Com-
mission’s political authority – all the commentators have noted Manuel Barroso’s 
extreme discretion in this situation – that the issue of reducing public deficits, 
driven by the German central bankers in particular in order to combat massive 
public indebtedness, is quickly becoming an imperative for the entire subfield. 
The ECB provides a ‘doctrinal’ economic and financial impetus, with the 
positions of German central bankers, such as Jürgen Stark, followed by the 
Governing Council. The Commission then impels a process of increasing legal 
‘proceduralization’ aimed at returning to budgetary balance, embodied in Olli 
Rehn’s position, a permanent or long-timer in the field, former Commissioner’s 
head of cabinet, then former Commissioner of Enterprise and Information 
Society, later Commissioner of Enlargement, and from 2010 to 2014 Commis-
sioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, which is also supported and legiti-
mized by the central political actors. In this process, the dynamics within a 
field of social and political forces characterized by relatively stable balances 
and a point of equilibrium between opposing fractions of the field is undoubt-
edly more directly ‘explanatory’ than are ‘ideological’ factors conceived as 
autonomous sources independent of the actors. The doctrinal impetus provided 
by the ECB reactivates the provisions already in place, which will then crystal-
lize into underground movements toward economic and legal alignment, which 
are more a matter of (bureaucratic) business as usual than of a conscious and 
structured crusade for austerity. It is in this practical and relational context that 
the actors remain embedded within the neoliberal symbolic order that defines 
the global ‘ideological framework.’ 
Finally, the evolution of the ECB towards the ‘west pole’ of the space de-
fined by the first two axes, the most academic and economic, is illustrated by 
the differences in position between Trichet and Mario Draghi on the one hand 
and the replacement of Barroso/Rehn by the Jean-Claude Junker/Pierre Mosco-
vici pair on the other. This shift is associated with a policy that is less and less 
‘conventional,’ or even more and more heretical in monetary terms, and at the 
same time discreetly inclined towards more stimulus (the Junker plan, the eas-
ing of judgments). In order not to jeopardize the compromise, this is being 
played out both in relative discretion and with a tightening of the discourse of 
budgetary and structural exemplarity. These changes do not correspond to a 
political and paradigmatic change which is caught up in the relations between 
this fraction of the field and the political compromises established between the 
dominant political fields, but they nevertheless bring about policy adjustments 
which lead to increased investment in the ECB’s communication (Fontan 
2013). The Commission is in the dual position of having to communicate these 
adjustments to economic and financial players without disturbing the political 
balance, which the Member States also maintain by means of partly symbolic 
operations (the ‘golden rule’ and a budgetary treaty that establishes measures 
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already existing), as well as playing an increasing role as budgetary watchdog 
with the implementation of the European semester. 
3. The World of Yanis 
How did Varoufakis encounter the structure of this field? What were the condi-
tions of the inseparably political and cultural shock triggered by his intervention? 
To understand this, it is not enough to study Varoufakis’s social properties; it is 
also important to show how these characteristics were activated under the in-
fluence of the field’s structure and to what extent they structured his interven-
tion in the field, in particular by placing him within a world that was finally 
quite different from the centre of the field. 
3.1   An Indirect Byproduct of the Field 
It should be noted first of all that Varoufakis’s position and the radicalism that he 
would deliberately carry were direct products of the field and, in a certain sense, 
of the rupture that the political outputs of the field introduced both in the equilib-
rium of a set of European societies and in the cleavages that now divide the field 
of economists on a global level. The debt crisis triggered the intervention of the 
‘troika’ and the implementation of tough austerity policies, accompanied by 
structural reforms; the legal-institutional framework was simultaneously 
strengthened throughout the Euro area, with a series of measures leading to a new 
treaty aimed at tightening the conditions for applying legal regulations. The 
‘events’ that occurred during the period were mainly due to the social and politi-
cal effects of the economic dynamics at work: In Greece, the staggering rise in 
unemployment and poverty that accompanied a recession that was much stronger 
than anticipated also resulted in wide-ranging movements in the political sphere. 
It was the push of an extreme right-wing ‘populism,’ as in many European coun-
tries, but above all the rise in power of critical social forces, embodied in the 
political space by the radical left political party Syriza. 
Intellectual contestation spread across a broad spectrum, from the United 
States to the various European countries. In particular, it was embodied by critical 
economists such as Varoufakis and James K. Galbraith, who developed detailed 
proposals to reform the Euro area starting in 2011. This intellectual mobilization 
took the form of a rapprochement with protesting political parties after the dis-
crediting of Pasok, the social democratic party. Varoufakis even became one of 
the leading figures of Syriza, and Galbraith his close advisor. In 2015, the radical 
left-wing party triumphed in the Greek parliamentary elections. The event was an 
important symbol for the radical left, which saw it as a relative opening of what 
was possible, which was probably not the perception of most of the players in the 
field of Eurocracy, fearing the danger of ‘radicalism’ and feeling themselves, at 
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the same time, protected by the political segmentation and Greece’s relative 
economic and political position. 
3.2 An Anglo-Americanized and Very Public Academic-Political 
Trajectory 
Resulting from the crisis and the previous outcomes of the field, the arrival of 
Varoufakis nevertheless remains to be seen as part of a longer trajectory. Va-
roufakis is a left-wing scholar, at the same time very much integrated in inter-
national economics, ‘heterodox’ according to the usual classifications in the 
world of economists, and very at ease among Greek elites and the media. His 
thesis at the University of Essex, obtained in 1987, opened him up to a univer-
sity career specializing in game theory, which he pursued successively in Great 
Britain, Australia, and Greece. 
Although he was active in a black students’ association in Great Britain, Va-
roufakis mainly benefited from the integration of his family in the Greek upper 
classes, with his father a chemist and president of the steelworks, Halyvourgiki 
S. A. Returning to Greece in 2000 after working in Australia (where he ac-
quired Australian citizenship), he was an advisor to Social Democrat Giorgi 
Papandreou between 2004 and 2006. This contributed to his accumulation of 
political-media capital, which explains the term ‘star economist’ that is some-
times attributed to him in connection with his marriage to world-renowned 
artist Danae Stratou and their common economic and cultural activities.  
The peculiarity of Varoufakis’s nomination as Greek Finance Minister of a 
‘radical left’ government is that it was preceded by a steady rise in visibility 
since the Greek crisis, particularly through the dissemination of proposals for 
reforms concerning the Eurozone. By developing what they call their “modest 
proposition,” Varoufakis and his friend Galbraith, son of John Kenneth Galbraith 
and professor of economics at the University of Texas, took a stand at the heart 
of the Eurozone’s debates, taking an original position between the constraints 
inherent in the narrow field (they rely on existing institutions and do not wish 
to engage in treaty reform) as well as the broader field of global economists 
(their proposal would allow them to emerge from the crisis of public debt by 
relaunching public investment in the United States and the United Kingdom). 
3.3 On Some (Cut) Wires: The Structure of the Entourage and the 
Vision of the Game 
An analysis of the actors present in Varoufakis’s book is a good way to investigate 
his vision of the game and the stakes involved. An initial qualitative analysis 
leads us, after leaving aside the “secondary” actors, to retain a nucleus of effec-
tive agents defined by the substantial importance of their roles in the narration. 
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The field as seen by Varoufakis: A specific MCA 
The statistical analysis covers all the individuals (n=98) involved to varying 
degrees in the field, as cited by Varoufakis in his book. The aim was to con-
struct the space of the effective agents during the Greek crisis, as Varoufakis 
recreates it in his work, especially between January 2015 and July 2015: It is 
therefore a construction centred around or based on an agent, which is a way 
of reconstructing the universe as he sees it, while situating Varoufakis himself 
in this universe. 
The 7 active variables of the specific MCA are the following (with their 39 
categories, except for the passive categories, indicated by an asterisk): 
1) Role in history (2: major / minor) 
2) Nationality (8: American / Northern and Eastern European / Southern 
European / British / French / German / Greek / neither European nor 
US-American*) 
3) Institutional position at the beginning of the narration (12: European 
Commission and European Investment Bank / Collaborator / Journalist-
Barrister / IMF / Artist / ECB / Financier / Greek government / Politics 
US / Finance minister Eurozone / Economist / Political Leader EU) 
4) Level of education (3: Doctorate / Master / Bachelor and other) 
5) Discipline of specialization (4: Economics / Public Administration / Science 
/ Humanities) 
6) Year of birth (4: before 1949/1949-1954/1954-1961/1962 or later) 
7) Dominant career (6: Politics / Academic / Finance-Consulting / Public 
Service / Artist / Lawyer) 
 
Three distinct groups can be identified. First is a core group that includes those 
closest to the author: his wife Stratou, his friend Galbraith, and immediate 
collaborators. This group is characterized by intense interpersonal relationships 
throughout the period.  
Second is the team made up of Varoufakis’s closest advisers and set up 
around Galbraith and loyal allies such as the American Jeff Sachs. Varoufakis’s 
‘close relationships’ comprise a strong over-representation of Anglo-American 
economic and financial experts, both academic and financial. Euclide Tsakalo-
tos was initially one of them, but he would separate himself from this second 
group to become one of Varoufakis’s close “traitors.” 
A third group, initially closely linked to but distinct from the previous two, 
consists of Varoufakis’s allies inside the Syriza government and administration. 
This circle is structured around various actors, primarily Tsipras and govern-
ment politicians, with whom Varoufakis had to cooperate. He could be seen 
with Ioannis Dragasakis (who became vice-prime minister), and so on. They 
are actors to whom his destiny was linked, even if he was not close to them, or 
even relatively hostile towards them at first. George Chouliarakis had a particu-
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lar role in this group, since it very quickly became clear that he was not a relia-
ble collaborator: He would become the major internal actor in the dissociation 
of Varoufakis from the Tsipras government and, in August 2015, his temporary 
successor. Another close Tsipras adviser, Nikkos Pappas, on the other hand, 
was closer to Varoufakis, but finally dissociated himself from him as well. 
These Greek academic economists ‘close to Varoufakis’s in the field were thus, 
in a significant way, those who would dissociate themselves from him as he 
encountered obstacles in his project.  
Figure 3: Specific MCA “Yanis’s World,” Plane 1-2, Cloud of Individuals 
 
During Varoufakis’s term, the latter group increased their proximity to what 
appears to be the central group of crisis actors, economists, and leaders of the 
Troika institutions (Poul Thomsen and Christine Lagarde for the IMF, Klaus 
Masuch and members of the ECB Executive Board, Declan Costello for the 
Commission) and the pillars of the Eurogroup (Thomas Wieser for the EWG and 
Jeroen Dijsselbloem). As the central group in the field, this ‘deep establishment’ 
according to Varoufakis is thus made up of civil servants and political leaders, 
generally with legal training, who acted as intermediaries, in particular between 
the finance ministers and the Greek and German governments. French leaders 
appear to have been closer intermediaries than the German Social Democrats, 
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members of the government. The only players in this central group who found 
themselves at one point in a proposal put forward by Varoufakis were certain 
leaders of the countries of the South and the Secretary-General of the OECD, 
José Ángel Gurría. 
Central political actors with less economic legitimacy, such as Tsipras and 
Angela Merkel, but also François Hollande, played a relatively minor role in 
the day-to-day functioning of the field, but their strategies had structural effects 
on its main orientations. Finally, many peripheral actors were marginally mobi-
lized and maintained a position of benevolent neutrality or sometimes stronger 
support, as in the case of the American Bernie Sanders. 
 
Figure 4a: Specific MCA “Yanis’s World,” Plane 1-2, Cloud of Categories 
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Figure 4b: Specific MCA “Yanis’s World,” Plane 1-3, Cloud of Categories 
 
Mapping the actors’ positions helps to represent the ‘world of Yanis’ with 
some accuracy. It draws three axes, which we characterize in the following way 
(see also Appendix 2): The first axis is strongly determined by each actor’s 
position, discipline, and nationality, the second by his or her main career, institu-
tion, and education level, and the third by the actor’s nationality and institution, 
and marginally his or her discipline. The first axis clearly contrasts the ‘insiders 
of Varoufakis’s game’ on the left, those with and against whom he struggles, so 
to speak, with the ‘outsiders of his game’ on the right. The highest contributing 
categories are ‘independent,’ artist, humanities, Bachelor’s degree (“licence” in 
French) and others on the right-hand side, and the role during the sequence is 
split on both sides (important on the left, secondary on the right): The axis is in 
fact relatively specific to outsiders of the field, whose roles were marginal. 
The second axis pits the academic economists’ pole at the bottom against 
the politico-administrative pole at the top. The highest contributing modalities 
are a doctorate, the economy, Varoufakis’s team, Anglo-Saxon academic, and 
academic career, below, versus a Master’s degree, public administration, politi-
cal career, EU government, and born after 1962, at the top. This axis clearly 
describes Varoufakis’s academic and Anglo-Saxon base, which makes him an 
insider from the point of view of its political and administrative legitimacy.  
The third axis contrasts actors based on their nationality, in particular ac-
cording to an opposition between the Anglo-Saxon world and Southern, Northern 
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and Eastern Europe, but also according to the position each held (politician or 
economist, Anglo-Saxon, versus artist and independent European).  
4. Lost in Translation? Yanis and the European Labyrinth 
The balance of power at play within the Eurogroup between January and July 
of 2015 was, of course, that of a coalition led by an economically powerful 
country, but one increasingly reluctant to engage in policies of European soli-
darity, and a small country that was financially desperate and had very little 
relative autonomy. From this point of view, the lack of resources that a Greek 
minister had in relation to actors bound by a powerful political compromise 
was undoubtedly sufficient to constitute the general causal factor in his diffi-
culty overturning the table. However, sticking to too-simple variables in the 
‘balance of power’ would lead us to declare the ‘failure of the Varoufakis ex-
periment’ (whereas, in terms of the longer history of European ‘crises,’ we 
have to deal with a series of other blows) and, above all, to leave a series of 
important questions in the shadows. Why did Varoufakis’s intervention end up 
taking such radical forms of misunderstanding and mutual exclusion? Why, 
moreover, did he play what he played, stand his ground and prefer resigning 
rather than rallying (like his presumed comrades in arms), or even try to change 
his experience into a transnational charisma? A comparison of the structure of 
the most bureaucratic fraction of the field with that of the ‘world of Yanis’ 
reveals what is at stake in this story. Indeed, it reveals a set of shifts and asym-
metries not only in the positions, but also in the reading and simultaneously the 
modes of play of the different protagonists. The study thus shows that Va-
roufakis was in a position where he was at the same time ‘too’ political, too 
much an economist and ultimately too Americanized; he was both too much on 
too many aspect and overdoing, as E. Goffamn would have said, although he 
seems to have been driven to do so and to have not completely suffered from it. 
Everything actually happened here as though, due to these discrepancies, the 
protagonists had not been playing entirely the same game. This is what made 
him lose at first glance, but at the same time offered him resources to hold on 
and then make a rather unexpected exit.  
4.1  A Foreign Body 
A priori, one might have thought that Varoufakis had rather a lot of assets, as an 
economist connected to the US and certain key figures in the world economy 
(his meeting with Larry Summers, which opens the book, is presented as a 
“summit,” close for Varoufakis to a “political summit” indeed). In reality, 
however, he seems to have been in relative misalignment, especially in relation 
to what appears to us to have been the heart of the game.  
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As we have shown above, the heart of the field of Eurocracy is occupied by 
agents who are ‘permanents’ in the field, more willingly at the interface of 
administration and politics, and strongly and durably invested in Europe. It is 
from this point of view, rather remarkably, that this fraction of the field, that of 
the administrators, directors general or directors of the treasury, is rather absent 
from the world of Varoufakis, even though these players are central to the field. 
Hence, the positions of Martin Selmayr and Luc Tholoniat seem to us, regard-
less of their possible nuances on the political level, to be both typical of an 
interface between this administrative fraction of the field and Yanis’s world, 
and exemplary of the whole distance separating these two worlds. This be-
comes immediately obvious when recalling their trajectories: Selmayr spent his 
entire career in Europe, graduating in Germany and later in London, not in the 
US. After having worked for two years at the European Central Bank, he really 
began his career in a leading German political media company, then for 10 
years in cabinet functions within the Commission and Luxembourg networks of 
institutions. His academic investments are much more in the field of law (in-
cluding central bank law) than in economics, and again in Europe. Tholoniat’s 
position in the field was ultimately very close to Selmayr’s, with a diploma 
from Sciences Po Paris and the LSE (hence a member-state/London structure 
similar to that of Selmayr). Although Tholoniat has a Master’s degree in eco-
nomics, he obtained it at Sciences Po, where they teach a programme that was 
far from pure economics (Lebaron 2000). His career continued with 18 years of 
experience in the European Commission, again in ‘horizontal’ positions (that is 
to say, cross-cutting highly valued positions such as in the Secretariat General). 
His publications cover areas that are mainly related to institutional analysis or 
the mechanics of European public policies, such as the European constitution, 
the open method of coordination, and others. From this point of view, we can 
see the gap that existed between Eurocratic figures such as Selmayr and Tholo-
niat and the ephemeral Greek Finance Minister, who did not have any experi-
ence in the administration and was at the opposite end of the continuum in the 
field of Eurocracy. He arrived in politics at an advanced stage of his career and 
found himself propelled into a European game of which he knew neither the 
structure nor the social agents, getting acquainted with its mechanics only as he 
gradually gained presence in the field.  
The distance is just as strong from the political fraction of the field of Euro-
pean economic governance. The vision of a duel with Wolfgang Schäuble has 
been used many times, starting with Galbraith and Varoufakis, but also by the 
media, who appreciate the rare moments when European politics allows incar-
nate staging. This agonistic dimension, very much in line with the myth of 
Theseus, contains an implicit statement centred around the confrontation with 
the monster, the embodiment of “German intransigence,” according to an ex-
pression frequently used in the public debate on Greek crisis and which must 
be deconstructed analytically (there are always more than two ‘deciders,’ they 
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never decide alone and are not driven by habitus independently of fields in 
which they act, not to mention the dynamics of process and context). This 
symbolic duel nevertheless reflects the broader struggle to define legitimate 
political properties of power on the spot. In doing so, the image invites us to 
point out that, from a relational point of view, the capital possessed by the 
supposed duettists and their embeddedness in the field are indeed very differ-
ent. There is, of course, a difference in their positions on the scale of power (a 
large country, economically ‘exemplary’ and a leader of a coalition with a 
strong majority on the one hand; small country, in serious economic difficulty, 
with no coalition behind on the other hand). Regardless of this, however, 
Schäuble, unlike Varoufakis, is a political professional: He sat for several dec-
ades in the Bundestag for the CDU, became Interior Minister in 1989 and par-
ticipated in the implementation of the Eurozone project within the German 
government led by Helmut Kohl. Although his career changed in 2000 during 
the “slush fund scandal,” which prevented him from running for chancellor, he 
continued to occupy a key position within the CDU. In 2009, he became Fi-
nance Minister in Merkel’s cabinet and shortly after became the symbol of 
Germany’s toughest budgetary stance. A doctor in law, Schäuble was also a 
senior civil servant in the Baden-Württemberg tax administration and a lawyer. 
His wife, an engineer and economist, chaired an NGO fighting world hunger. 
His economic expertise is therefore primarily that of a trained practitioner and 
lawyer, with a very strong political foothold. Last but not least, as can be seen 
in Figure 3, he is situated much closer to the centre of the field, to which Va-
roufakis does not belong. Schäuble is not only in a strong position within the 
Merkel government and in the German political arena, but also in his relation-
ship to the field of Eurocracy, in which he has long been struggling and where 
he is in a position to create positions. In this respect, he enjoys other assets 
besides his pure strength, such as the confidence that the longevity of his man-
date can inspire in the field (as opposed to sudden political legitimization), his 
training as a former civil servant and lawyer, and his European constancy, 
embodied for example by his Francophony and Francophilia or his proximity to 
Kohl, which are likely to make his mandate recognized as a form of incarnation 
(and sure value) that is very different within the field than outside it. 
This is not the case with Varoufakis. His strong academic and intellectual 
capital shifts him further away from the centre of the field, rather than crediting 
him. To the North of the map, as we have shown, generalists in administrative 
and political coordination functions dominate. Their intellectual background is 
both much more transversal (law/political science + economics) and, at the 
same time, lower than that of the PhD in Economics. In the European bureau-
cratic field, intellectual capital and even the title of doctor, be it in law or eco-
nomics (Georgakakis and de Lassalle 2010), does count, but only as an access 
route to dominant political-administrative positions, not an end in itself. For 
this type of position, publication is a way of consolidating one’s position with-
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out being decisive. From this point of view, Varoufakis’s position was almost 
chiasmatic: In comparison to his counterparts, he was both incumbent on the 
scale of economists and an outsider on the politico-bureaucratic scale. He bene-
fited from academic capital whose accumulation has so far been a form of 
‘raison d’être.’ Everything indicates (early militancy, commitment to causes at 
the margins of the political game) that his political investments were rarely an 
end in themselves or directed towards obtaining a position in the field of power, 
which again, arrived by the back door through an election that was long unlikely. 
From a structural point of view, his political commitment (sincere as long as he 
remains within the confines of his intellectual rationality) can be read as an 
opportunity to gain a form of intellectual notoriety, which could, for example, 
objectively bring him closer to the notoriety of Nobel Prizes (such as Stiglitz 
who took strong position on the Eurocrisis), Nobel Prize of which he is not, 
however, a potential candidate. From the point of view of the field, the alliance 
he could forge with the most intellectual and American fraction represented by 
central bankers was also problematic, in the sense that it could exacerbate the 
tension in the field and, above all, undermine the compromise reached on the 
non-conventional measures observed above. 
This succession of discrepancies had consequences for the social relations of 
alliances and the networks of proximity that it wove. The study of the positions 
in the system of alliances as an additional variable in the MCA analysis ex-
plained in the previous section shows very clearly not only the relative exterior-
ity of Varoufakis, but also that of his supporters, whose position reveals a great 
exteriority, especially with regard to the different modes of opposition: Neu-
trals, supporters, and friends are rather situated more to the right on the first 
axis. Supporters were primarily academic, like direct collaborators. On the 
other hand, in the upper left, the actors of the dominant quadrant are divided 
between the three types of opposites, without strong differentiation, as though 
the final positions were, for one part, finally written into the structure of the 
field from the beginning. 
4.2  Vision of the Game and Possible Calculations 
One of the interests of studying in detail the position of a social agent within a 
field is to relate the position in the game with his or her vision of the game. This 
seems particularly important to us here. Varoufakis is and presents himself as an 
enthusiast of game theory, and there is throughout his book a game-theory type of 
rationality but also a more general one that he puts forward. However, this ration-
ality seems to be due to decontextualized analysis, in any case rather out of step 
with the specificities of the game in the field of Eurocracy and one of its major 
components. Varoufakis is in fact placed in a situation in which he cannot play on 
the long term, through step-by-step strategies, the subtlety of alliances or the 
setting of the agenda, since so many rules of behaviour are implicit in the field. 
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But, even more importantly, his vision of the game never seems to put him in a 
position to try to estimate the sociological specificity of the world in which he is 
propelled. It is undoubtedly here that one of the paradoxes of his position is 
played out. Objectively shifted and even dominated in the field, Varoufakis is at 
the same time subjectively in an outlying position: as an intellectual among me-
chanics, and more broadly as an American peninsula among Europeans. His 
vision of the game, as we can reconstruct it from his testimony (which is also a 
way of continuing to weigh in and thus impose his vision of the game), deserves 
from this point of view a few lines of analysis. 
Before we begin, the meeting with Larry Summers with which his book starts 
is a good illustration of this. It not only delivers one of the keys to the narrative, 
but is perhaps also a good indicator of his reading of the ‘game.’  
There are two types of politicians [says Summers]. Those who are, the insid-
ers, and those who are not, the outsiders. The latter privilege their freedom of 
speech to give their version of the truth. The price of this freedom is to be ig-
nored by the insiders, who make important decisions. Insiders have a sacro-
sanct principle: never turn against their peers and never say what they do or 
say to others. What is the advantage? Access to confidential information and 
the possibility, not guaranteed, of influencing essential characters and out-
comes. So, Yanis, which band do you belong to? [Varoufakis 2011] 
Varoufakis reminds us a little further on that he opts for the position of outsider 
who remains against everything connected to the real world.  
Throughout the book, Varoufakis portrays himself as an incarnation of pure 
rationality, even in his resignation which ultimately saved Tsipras’s reversal 
(which he nevertheless qualifies as political suicide). It is, however, an abstract 
and de-socialized rationality that is in reality highly positioned socially (in this 
case, that of a dominant, which is due to his socialization). Varoufakis’s reason-
ing is based on man-to-man relationships, again in an agonistic and virile form 
that is characteristic of the dominant, of which he has inheritance and a trajectory 
(from a Greek point of view), but which he is not in the field. The contempt for 
Hollande (and indeed his cowardice) comes ultimately from the most socially 
dominant form of masculinity (Matonti 2017). 
However, his distance from politics gives him an almost naive vision of this 
game, even if the book shows his learning from this point of view. His is thus a 
vision of politics that severely minimizes the role of the administration; it is a 
classic liberal vision that enshrines the primacy of politics and makes the admin-
istration its pure relay. Varoufakis does not surround himself with any allies from 
the administrative field, therefore, but instead has his principal allies outside. His 
view advocates a dialogue between decision-makers as though the administration 
did not exist. When Dijsselbloem comes to meet him in Athens, they isolate 
themselves from the administration. He believes symmetrically in the autonomy 
of political institutions. However, while the political fraction of the field is visible 
in the Eurogroup, it is not always as decisive as is the framework defined by the 
administrators on a daily basis. There are certainly political transactions happen-
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ing, but at another level (as when Tusk isolates Merkel, Hollande, and Tsipras), 
which takes heavily into account the inertia accumulated in the bureaucratic 
fraction of the field. 
Typical of an agent situated on the margins of the political field, he also thinks 
that the blows are made from theoretical positions (when they are not ideological, 
from the economic point of view) rather than in the compromise and restrictions 
imposed by the political constraints of the rulers (Bourdieu 1981). This vision 
leads him to search for “policy coherence” among political professionals (he 
reproaches Dijsselbloem for his lack of coherence during his first visit), but also 
to have a rather limited grasp of the dependency of one agent on others. In his 
“duel” with Schäuble, he rarely takes into account the relations between the Ger-
man government and the Bundestag (Beichelt 2015), and very little account of 
the link with the peculiarities of the space of economists’ thought in Germany or 
other countries (Fourcade 2009; Schmidt-Wellenburg 2018).  
Finally, he overestimates the ‘crisis effect,’ and in so doing overstates the 
charismatic and media outlets opened up by the situation and the possibility that 
Greece would benefit from it. Routine logic lives through moments of rupture 
and crisis, which can lead the political arena to resume its ‘rights,’ or in any event 
to weigh more heavily (temporal variation in the weight of spaces). However, it is 
quite likely that the protagonists have a completely different relationship to the 
‘crisis.’ In fact, crisis is routine for many agents in the field of Eurocracy, espe-
cially for the most permanent fraction. The political fraction is protected by the 
political and media segmentation of the European political field, which cuts off 
any momentum of a European public opinion that does not exist in a transnational 
form any more than it is a possible lever. The crisis has, moreover, activated 
above all the absolute differences in perceptions between Northern and Southern 
Europe in political mobilizations or in the national media, which feeds on all 
stereotypes in order to assign blame for the crisis (Adler-Nissen 2017). 
Its political interpretation is thus particularly problematic in the case of Euro-
pean politics, given the weight of the administration, the political segmentation 
and the belief in resilience capacities that animates the heart of the machine. 
From the European point of view, which is ultimately invested in very little by 
Varoufakis, Greece weighs less economically and politically. The potentially 
heterodox or heroic Greeks are very few in a structure that is otherwise inclined 
to preserve the political compromise. The dominant actors abuse it, and those 
who are not dominant, as well as the agents who represent the states in difficulty, 
try to show that they are less bad ‘pupils,’ an attitude quite contrary to that of the 
American professor. If Varoufakis’s position inclines him not to see the European 
game, the United States and its role models, on the contrary, are omnipresent in 
his story. He feels credited by his appointments with Summers, Lagarde, Barack 
Obama, Sanders, Brian Eno, and others, not to mention obviously the unwavering 
support of the son of the great John Kenneth Galbraith, support whose value is 
already beyond all expectations for a contender for global economic excellence. It 
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also underestimates the fact that, even if it is interdependent, the field of Eurocra-
cy is not soluble in global power, especially after the G8 (which is its expression), 
where a new, maintained and consolidated Eurozone path has clearly emerged 
since 2011. 
The way Varoufakis sees his possible allies, finally, is very consistent with 
that view. Beyond his own environment, the administrators, the agents who form 
the link between the political and economic fractions of the field and are in reality 
the most central actors of the field, are permanently minimized in the narrative. 
When they are finally mentioned, it is often in the form of a retrospective regret, 
as in the first passage on Wieser: 
Wieser was one of the driving forces behind the EU bureaucracy. He was 
chairman of the Eurogroup Working Group, a body whose role is to prepare 
the meetings of the Eurogroup, where each country’s finance ministers take 
key decisions. In theory, therefore, Wieser was the delegate of Jeroen Dijs-
selbloem, Dutch Finance Minister and President of the Eurogroup. What I did 
not know and what I would later measure is that he was the most powerful 
man in Brussels, much more powerful than Jean-Claude Juncker, the President 
of the European Commission, or Pierre Moscovici, the Commissioner for 
Economic and Financial Affairs (the Commission’s Minister of Finance), or 
even, on some occasions, more powerful than Dijsselbloem himself. Now he 
was really leading the way. (Varoufakis 2017, 135) 
His rather special relationship to Lagarde is another illustration of this in a more 
‘positive’ form. In this case, most of the time the narrative evokes a form of 
mutual seduction that presents almost a dream case to demonstrate the social 
foundations of elective affinities. In the field, the two players actually share the 
same American economics-led orientation and culture. Having been educated in 
France at Sciences Po, Aix and Université Paris X Nanterre and having acquired 
an LL.M., Lagarde worked for Baker & McKenzie, one of the largest globally 
active US economic law firms, for over 20 years, since 1999 as chairman of the 
company’s executive committee. In 2007 she became French Minister of Econo-
my and Finance. As such, together with Sarkozy she was one of the major politi-
cal actors in the 2008 crisis and the implementation of the Brussels compromise, 
endowed with a good knowledge of the mysteries of a central European country 
and the Franco-German (even forced) compromises. In 2011, she became director 
of the IMF. We can see the shift in Varoufakis’s position and vision in the fact 
that he makes her almost an ally in the centre of the game, whereas Lagarde’s 
central position is not completely in the role of IMF director or in forms that have 
a cost. If he credits Lagarde with revealing to him the truth of the game, such as 
when she alerts him repeatedly as to the role of political capital, she is not his 
Ariadne and remains in the end in a position closer to Aethra, the mother of The-
seus who, according to the myth, alerts him about the robbers who lie in ambush 
on the way to Athens, but does not accompany him on his journey. 
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4.3 From a Position of Outsider inside the Field to the Formation 
of Charisma outside the Field 
Although he mobilized original capital, Varoufakis entered the field under 
conditions of very limited efficacy and faced powerful mechanisms of closure. 
We have seen that these are based above all on the reproduction of a very ho-
mogeneous group of actors, defining the logics specific to the field. This resulted 
in isolating him within the field, in disintegrating his meagre initial alliances, 
and in his public marginalization, a development propelled with the help of the 
media, which increasingly described him as a dangerous nonconformist deviator, 
in terms of both his physical appearance and clothing as well as so-called ver-
bal skids. 
The resources mobilized by Varoufakis ultimately had very little influence 
on the ‘deep functioning’ of the ordinary institutional working of the Euro area, 
in particular the public arena of the Eurogroup and the operational nucleus of 
the EWG. Concretely, the only support he could have mobilized and which he 
either solicited or was obliged to accept were Greek economists faithful to his 
strategy, but as competitors and rivals rather than direct support. Varoufakis 
undoubtedly believed far too much in the intrinsic strength of American and 
international academic capital in the European field and was not sufficiently 
assured of strong support in his own networks, which were in particular made 
up of immediate (academic) professional competitors. His financial collabora-
tors, whether Anglo-Saxon or French, were also far removed from the institu-
tional and legal logic of the European institutions: Technically excellent, they 
could not be reliable interlocutors for the ‘institutions.’ Several interactions 
showed that they were disqualified, not because their expertise was irrelevant, 
but because of their exteriority to the field, similar to that of Varoufakis. 
His attempts to negotiate ‘financial bailout’ and reform grew increasingly 
difficult in the face of the closing positions opposed to him by the coalition 
around Germany embodied by Schäuble. Schäuble, carrying not only the inter-
est of the German taxpayers but also the political capital to embody the stabil-
ity of the compromise of the field, opposed the proposals by Galbraith and 
Varoufakis and pressed for different solutions with ever more intransigence, 
leading to a surrender by the Tsipras government in July 2015, followed by the 
departure of Varoufakis. Throughout this period, the latter had constantly mo-
bilized economic science in support of his institutional proposals and, at the 
same time, tried to rely on intermediate actors in order to isolate Schäuble. This 
had all the less effect because Varoufakis’s political opposition was largely 
public, that is to say it was again out of step with the cultural norms of the field 
of Eurocracy: Created as a form of bureaucratic buffer between open conflicts, 
it was based on a mode of domination that excluded explicit confrontation as 
much as advertising. 
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All in all, Varoufakis did not need to do much to get reproached for being 
provocateur to the field’s doxa. Because of his offset in the field and his read-
ing grids, his words were enough to have him suspected of engaging in every-
thing that was forbidden to the non-dominant actor: the explicit alliance within 
the global field, the purely economic reasoning, and the media polarization of 
his ‘duels.’ This scandalous, in a sense ‘passive’ strategy nevertheless opened 
up a heroic opportunity for him. While taking him out of the game, this strategy 
opened the way for quite unexpected possibilities. At that moment, his resistance 
surprised many and lasted longer than expected, which probably shifted a few 
boundaries; later on and further down that risky path, Varoufakis embodied an 
alternative crisis problematization, thereby creating a charismatic effect that he 
is now trying to routinize in an alternative transnational political organization. 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have shown the binding force within the field of Eurocracy in 
comparing two perspectives in and on this field. To reconstruct the diverging 
views of the field, we have used two MCAs: the first one centred on European 
insiders occupying the main administrative positions inside the field, and a 
second one from the world (environment, vision, networks) of a newcomer to 
the field. Everything indicates that Varoufakis as an economist, with his Amer-
ican culture and network, without political experience as a ruler and discover-
ing the EU game, was in the position of an outsider in many more ways than as 
the negotiator of a small country in debt. In analysing the field of European 
Economic governance through the two opposing fields of vision, we also 
showed that the discrepancy between the positions inside the field had im-
portant consequences for the resources of the different protagonists, but also for 
their visions of the game, modes of calculation, and rationalities. What was 
played by the different actors and how, was highly dependent on this, up to 
Varoufakis’s charisma-building strategy, which became a part of and even a 
stake in this game. All of this shows that the sociological structure of this collec-
tive agency that is the field of Eurocracy (with its internal oppositions between 
insiders and intermittent players in the field, economists vs. lawyers or politics-
based capital, permanent and silent administrators vs. visible politicians) is a 
powerful engine for what happens in the EU’s politics and the political economy.  
To conclude on the field using the metaphor that began this paper, we can 
say that Yanis was indeed mistaken in thinking that Europe would be his Ari-
adne to fight the global Minotaur. It can be added that, trained in and for other 
games, Yanis entered the unexpected labyrinth of European economic govern-
ance without any thread from Ariadne. This labyrinth was actually much more 
complex and solid than he could have suspected with his rationality as an out-
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sider – he did not manage to find a way to effectively challenge the power of 
the collective agent hidden within it and was ultimately excluded from it.  
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Appendix 1: Specific MCA “Subfield of Economic 
Governance in Eurocracy” 
Table 1:  Variance Rates (Eigenvalue λ), Variance Rates Cumulated and 
Cumulated Modified of Axis 1 to 10 
Axes Eigenvalue (λ) Variance Rates Cumulated % 
Variance Rates 
Modified % 
1 0,192 13,6 61,2 
2 0,118 21,9 12,7 
3 0,104 29,3 7,5 
4 0,096 36,1 5,3 
5 0,091 42,6 4,1 
6 0,088 48,8 3,4 
7 0,080 54,5 1,8 
8 0,078 60,0 1,6 
9 0,073 65,2 0,9 
10 0,071 70,2 0,7 
 
Table 2: Contributions of Variables to Variance of Axes 1 and 2 
Variables 
Contribution in Percent 
Axis 1 Axis 2 
Sex 5,4 0,0 
Year of Birth 12,0 10,3 
Training place 3,6 4,8 
Diploma place 6,5 15,1 
Level of education 5,6 3,2 
Law 12,6 1,0 
Economics 13,2 5,8 
Management 0,0 2,3 
HSR 43 (2018) 3  │  245 
Maths-Sciences 3,3 5,8 
Cabinet 12,4 13,9 
Horizontal mob 0,0 7,7 
Sector mob 11,5 25,0 
Previous exp admin 13,8 4,9 
 
Table 3: Contribution of Active Categories to Axis 1 (Mean Contribution 3.23%)  
Variable Category Contribution  in Percent 
Diploma place US Big (major universities) 4,2 
Year of Birth Born 30-40s 6,0 
Previous exp admin National administration 8,1 
Level of education PhD 3,6 
Economics Economics 6,1 
Law No Law 4,6 
Sector mob Mono-sector 3,3 
CENTRAL ZONE CENTRAL ZONE CENTRAL ZONE 
Previous exp admin European administration 5,7 
Economics No Economics 7,1 
Sex Woman 4,1 
Birth Year Born 60-70-80s 5,4 
Sector mob Pluri-sectorial 7,4 
Law Law 8,1 
Cabinet Cabinet Commissioner 8,7 
TOTAL  82,4 
 
Table 4: Contribution of Active Categories to Axis 2 (Mean Contribution 3.23%)  
Variable Category Contribution  in Percent 
Sector mob Other sect 11,0 
Cabinet Cabinet Minister or Nat Lea 10,9 
Maths-Sciences Maths-Stats-Sciences 5,3 
Year of Birth Born 50s 7,8 
Diploma place Other EU 8,1 
Sector mob Pluri-sectorial 6,0 
Previous exp admin National administration 3,2 
CENTRAL ZONE CENTRAL ZONE CENTRAL ZONE 
Diploma place EU Big 3,4 
Horizontal mob No horizontal position 4,6 
Sector mob Mono-sector 8,0 
Diploma place US Big 3,7 
TOTAL  72,0 
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Appendix 2: Specific MCA “Yanis’s World” 
Table 1:  Variance Rates (Eigenvalue λ), Variance Rates Cumulated and 
Modified of Axis 1 to 6  
Axes Eigenvalue (λ) Variance Rates Cumulated % 
Variance Rates 
Modified % 
1 0,455 9,9 36,7 
2 0,392 18,3 24,0 
3 0,304 24,9 10,8 
4 0,278 30,9 7,9 
5 0,240 36,1 4,4 
6 0,234 41,2 4,0 
 
Table 2: Contributions of Variables to Variance of Axes 1 and 2 
Variables 
Contribution in Percent 
Axis 1 Axis 2 
Role 10,3 1,2 
Nation 13,5 13,2 
Diploma 11,6 19,2 
Discipline 19,2 14,2 
Position 22,3 19,4 
Year of Birth 4,2 6,9 
Career 18,9 25,9 
 
Table 3: Contribution of Active Categories to Axis 1 (Mean Contribution 2.56%)  
Variable Category Contribution  in Percent 
Position ECB 2,9 
Career Academic 3,1 
Role 1 5,3 
Discipline Economics 3,5 
CENTRAL ZONE CENTRAL ZONE CENTRAL ZONE 
Role 2 5,0 
Year of Birth < 1949 2,6 
Diploma Bachelor-Other 8,9 
Position Financier 3,3 
Nation British 7,7 
Position Artist 4,9 
Discipline Humanities-DK 14,7 
Position Journalist-Barrister 4,1 
Career Artist 11,4 
TOTAL  77,5 
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Table 4: Contribution of Active Categories to Axis 2 (Mean Contribution 2.56%)  
Variable Category Contribution  in Percent 
Position Economist 9,2 
Career Academic 13,2 
Nation American 4,1 
Diploma PhD 8,6 
Discipline Economics 5,1 
CENTRAL ZONE CENTRAL ZONE CENTRAL ZONE 
Year of Birth >=1962 4,2 
Diploma Master-GE 10,5 
Discipline Law Public Adm 8,2 
Position Political leader EU 3,7 
Career Politics 12,1 
Position Commission-BEI 3,7 
Nation French 5,5 
TOTAL   88,1 
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